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The Child and the State: Adversaries
in the Juvenile Justice System
By
Stephen Wiznero
Did we win or lose?
We won.
Yeah? What did we win?l
When the child and the state confront each other in the juvenile
justice system, no amount of benevolent intentions, studied informality, or
euphemistic terminology should be allowed to obscure the fact that they
are, in fact, adversaries. What is at stake in juvenile delinquency proceed-
ings is the child's right to liberty and his right to continue in the custody
of his parents against the state's power to control crime and enforce morality.
Despite this fact, the juvenile justice system created by legislation in
virtually every state was empowered to disregard customary procedures
for protecting the accused from the power of the state. It was allowed to
employ instead a non-adversary, rehabilitative, parental approach in "treat-
ing" children, both those charged with special juvenile offenses2 (e.g., in-
corrigibility, truancy) and those charged with offenses criminal for adults.s
Such a departure was based on good intentions. Reformers anxious to
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1. Conversation between a child and this writer after a successful defense to a
charge of burglary in a juvenile delinquency hearing.
2. These special juvenile offenses continue today. N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE
HONEST POLITICIANS GUIDE To CRIME CoNTROL 146 (1970):
Conditions included in the various statutory descriptions of delinquent be-
havior comprise a medley consisting of anything from smoking cigarettes,
truancy, sleeping in alleys, and using vulgar language to major felonies
such as rape and homicide. Moreover, such vague imprecise and subjective
terms as idleness, loitering, waywardness, stubbornness, incorrigibility and
immoral conduct are commonly employed.
3. See, e.g., A.M. I'LA-rr, THE CHILD SAVERS 137-45 (1969). An excellent study
of the history of the juvenile court.
HeinOnline -- 4 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 390 1972
Columbia ltuman Rights Law Review [Vol. 4
save the children were repelled by the rigidities, technicalities, and harsh-
ness in the substantive and procedural criminallaw.4 They were convinced
that youth crime was not a problem of law enforcement but a social-
psychological problem of children and their families requiring interven-
tions of a therapeutic nature, involving state interference with and as-
sumption of the parental function of child rearing.5 This rationale was
reinforced by a legal theory of the state's power to act as parens patriae
derived improperly from practices of the English courts of chancery.6 The
lack of formal legal procedures and protections for the children was justi-
fied on the ground that nothing "bad" was being done to the children,
but rather something "good" was being provided for them. The fact that
the result of these proceedings was often the removal of the child from
his parents and his placement in an institution was considered a reasonable
state extension of parental discipline. The child, never totally at liberty,
was simply moved from the inadequate or damaging custody of his parents
to the benevolent custody of the state.7
Flaws in the system began to show up early. The removal of the child
frequently was unjustified, high handed, and cruel.8 Since the discretion
of a juvenile judge was immense, unlimited by anything but his benevo-
lence, parents and children were literally at his mercy.9 The institutions to
which the child was removed were, as often as not, overcrowded, regi-
mented, poorly equipped and inadequately staffed detention centers where
nothing really rehabilitative was done for the child.10 "Delinquent" and
"neglected" children were often confined together in bleak and impersonal
institutions which were constantly criticized and almost never improved.
Since a distinctive feature of the juvenile court was indeterminate sen-
tencing, children frequently remained in these institutions for years for
nothing more than tmancy.u
Though reformist, the juvenile court movement from the beginning
had an authoritarian impulse evident both from its belief in the need for
firm control of delinquents and its sense of children as helpless depen-
4. See, e.g., F.A. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 47-48 (1964).
5. See, e.g., Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 fuRV. L. REv. 104 (1909); THE
CIULD, THE CLINIC AND THE COURT (}. ADDAMS ed. 1925).
6. See, e.g., Cogan, Juvenile Law Before and After the Entrance of Parens Patriae,
22 S.C.L. REv. 147 (1970); Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile
Court, 23 S.C.L. REv. 205 (1971). See also discussion infra at 392.
7. See note 5 supra.
8. Rendleman, supra note 6, at 237-45; A.M. PLATT, supra note 3, at 103-04.
9. A rare, early case holding a parens patriae commitment to reform school
unconstitutional was People v. Turner, 55 TIL 280 (1870), cited in A.M. PLATT,
supra note 3, at 104.
10. A.M. PLATT, supra note 3, at 145-52.
n. Id. at 150-51.
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dents.12 Characterized also by middle-class bias, it set high standards of
family propriety which it invoked primarily against lower-class families. IS
As dissatisfaction with the lack of procedural safeguards in juvenile
proceedings grew, first the states14 and then the Supreme Court acted to
prOvide protections. In In re Gault,15 an appeal from a decision in which
a I5-year-old boy was sentenced to a state institution until his majority for
making a lewd telephone call that he denied making, the Supreme Court
at last confronted the claim of the parens patriae doctrine that juveniles
were outside the constitutional scheme and rejected it. However, it did not
overthrow the juvenile court system, nor indeed, many other aspects of
parens patriae. The Court carefully confined its holding to the adjudicatory
phase of confinement. For this phase it did not demand exact conformity with
adult criminal procedural safeguards but only a standard of "fundamental
fairness" combined with four specific procedural protections: the right to
adequate and timely notice, confrontation of witnesses, counsel,16 and the
privilege against self-incrimination. Later, in In re Winship,t7 the Court
carefully added to the list of specific safeguards the requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. However, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania18 the
Court refused to add the right to a jury trial. Because the Court was
explicitly concerned that such a right would "... remake the juvenile pro-
ceeding into a fully adversary process . . . ending what has been the
idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal, protective proceeding,"19 it held
that a jury trial was not an essential element of "fundamental fairness."
The language of the Court in the progression of decisions from Gault
to McKeiver shows an increasing fear that the importation of procedural
safeguards into the juvenile system will destroy that system by making it
fully adversary.2o This concern with the adversary problem is a shift from
12. See, e.g., A.M. PLAIT, supra note 3, at 135-36. Some social scientists today
stress the need for programs that provide autonomy, responsibility and a sense of
competence in rehabilitating delinquent adolescents. Wheeler, Cottrell & Romasco,
Juvenile Delinquency: Its Prevention and Control, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REpORT: JUVENILE DE-
LINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 416 (1967). (Hereinafter called TASK FORCE REPORT.)
13. Id.
14. See, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
15. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
16. Id., at 13. It is regrettable that the right to counsel was confined to the
adjudicatory phase. Counsel is crucial to fairness at the intake and dispositional phases
of juvenile proceedings as well.
17. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
18. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
19. Id., at 545.
20. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366 (showing concern for "the informality,
flexibility or speed of the hearing at which the fact-finding takes place.") McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (quoted in the text), 550 (relating delay, formality,
and clamor to the adversary system).
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the reasoning in the Gault decision. There the Court stressed that some ele-
ments of adversary proceedings in juvenile court were necessary, but that
they would leave untouched other distinctive benefits of the juvenile system
such as separate treatment of juvenile offenders,21 no classification as a
criminal,22 no civil disability or disqualification for civil service appoint-
ment as a result of conviction,23 confidentiality of the proceedings,24 and
the presence of "kindly" juvenile judges.25 Gault also noted that much in-
formality could be retained as well, but questioned its value.26 The later
decisions bring back for the legal profession a set of questions that had
seemed largely laid to rest by the reasoning in Gault. Is the functioning of
the juvenile court threatened by vigorous adversary fact-finding, and, if
so, what is the meaning of the child's right to counsel?
It is, in truth, an old set of questions. Juveniles had counsel before
Gault, and the resulting problems were extensively discussed then.27 Gault's
emphasis on the need for counsel had apparently only qualified, not abol-
ished, the pervasive paternalistic approach of the juvenile courts. Parens
patriae lingers on, obscuring the adversary relation of the court and the
child, despite its historical irrelevancy and its danger to libertarian values.
The protective power of the sovereign as parens patriae exercised by
the courts of chancery in equity is not the historical basis for power over
troublesome children. In English practice, misbehaving children were pros-
ecuted, if at all, under the criminal laws. The chancellors invoked the
equitable doctrine of parens patriae only in resolving disputes between
private parties over guardianship and property matters affecting "infants
and idiots" who were deemed to be incapable of caring for themselves.28
The juvenile court's delinquency jurisdiction derives from the criminal
law,29 and the Elizabethan Poor Laws (and their American counterparts)
relating to the control of paupers and their children.30
As Morris and Hawkins have observed:
Historical idiosyncracies gave us a doubtful assumption of power
over children. With the quasi-legal concept of parens patriae to
brace it, this assumption of power blended well with the earlier
21. See, 387 U.S. at 22.
22. ld., at 23.
23. ld., at 24.
24.ld.
25. ld., at 27.
26. ld., 25-27.
27. See, e.g., THE NATIONAL CoUNClL OF JUVENILE COURT JUDGES, COUNSEL
FOR THE CmLD (1966). This is a symposium on the role of the lawyers in Juvenile
Court together with an extensive bibliography.
28. Rendleman, supra note 6.
29. See, R. POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 134-35 (1923).
30. Rendleman, supra note 6.
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humanitarian traditions in the churches and other charitable or-
ganizations regarding child care and childsaving. The juvenile
court is thus the product of paternal error and maternal generos-
ity, which is a not unusual genesis of illegitimacy.31
393
The point is not that the juvenile courts have no legal right to exist. It is
rather that their claim to be free of the need for an adversary balancing
of interests is based on their asserted identity of interest with the child.
They argue that the parens patriae approach to juvenile delinquency cases
removes the apparent conflict between the misbehaving child's desire for
liberty and his "obvious" need for corrective custody and guidance, by
asserting that the court does not deprive children of a right to liberty, but
rather grants them the right to parental care and discipline.32 The history
of the court reveals, however, that it has always been concerned with the
identification and control of wayward children as much in the interests
of public order as in the interests of the children.33 Whatever its benevolent
intentions, the juvenile system's concern for the "best interests" of the child
has been clearly affected by the demands made upon it to deal with the
crime problem posed by juveniles.34 Roughly half of the serious crimes in
the United States are committed by children of juvenile court age, although
this age group constitutes less than one-fifth of the total population.311 Re-
sponsibility for dealing with the problem of crime is as much that of the
juvenile courts as it is of adult criminal courts. Indeed, one of the main
functions of the juvenile justice system is law enforcement.36
31. N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, supra note 2, at 157.
32. See, e.g., Mack, supra note 5.
33. A.M. I'LArr, supra note 3, at 137-41.
34. F.A. ALLEN, supra note 4, at 43-50.
35. 118 Congressional Record (daily ed. February 8, 1972), S. 1331 (remarks
of Senator Birch Bayh).
Mr. President, juvenile crime in this country is reaching crisis proportions.
During the past decade, arrests of juveniles for violent crimes increased by
148 percent, and arrests of juveniles for property crimes, such as burglary
and auto theft, jumped 85 percent.
I am deeply alanned by these rapidly accelerating arrest rates for
young people. But I am even more alanned by the fact the juveniles now
represent almost half the crime population in this country. Children between
the ages of 10 and 17 compose only 16 percent of the national population,
yet they account for more than 48 percent of all arrests for serious crimes.
And the problem is even worse than the figures indicate, because a larger
proportion of adult arrests for serious crimes are those we failed to re-
habilitate as young offenders.
Our dismal failure to rehabilitate is dramatically clear from the re-
cidivism rate for juvenile delinquents estimated at 74 percent to 85 percent.
Our attempts to redirect young lives by the traditional means of incarcera-
tion in large training schools simply do not work; they succeed only in pro-
ducing more sophisticated, more alienated young criminals.
36. TASK FORCE REpORT 1 (1967):
The juvenile court has become the primary judicial agency for dealing with
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Furthermore, the fallacy of any easy analogy of the state's role to that
of the parent is immediately pointed up by the state's own interest in
the control and discipline of disruptive youth. There is a fundamental
difference between a parent's disciplining a child by placing limits on
his behavior and the state's punishing the child by imposing sanctions
such as arrest, detention, prosecution, stigmatization, probation and institu-
tionalization. Parents may not imprison children; the state can and does.s7
State institutions for children are notoriously far from home-like.ss The state,
as parent, subjects the child to cultural influences that may be both
foreign and unacceptable to the real parent and even to the child.s9
Intervention in family life is destructive of family solidarity, which is
frequently of more importance to minorities and the poor than those in
power are willing to admit.40 The state's concept of itself as parent can
lead to the idea that it should assume custody of children whose parents
are unconventional by dominant community standards.41 These are all
considerations of great social and political sensitivity, exposing the dangers
inherent in parens patriae.
Constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the
parents' claim to authority in the rearing of their children is basic to our
society.42 It is also clear that the state has an independent interest in
protecting the welfare of children and safeguarding them from abuses.43
Certainly in the adjustment of these two interests our political commitment
to the value of individual liberty demands scrupulous procedural safe-
guards for individual rights. This is particularly true now that we are
juvenile criminality, the singlemost pressing and threatening aspect of the
crime problem in the United States. One in every nine children· will be
referred to juvenile courts for an act of delinquency before his 18th birth-
day. Considering boys alone, the ratio is one in every six. Arrests of persons
under 18 for serious crimes increased 47 percent in 1965 over 1960; the
increase in that age group population for the same period was 17 percent.
In 1965 persons under 18 referred to juvenile court constituted 24 percent
of all persons charged with forcible rape, 34 percent of all persons charged
with burglary, 45 percent of all persons charged with larceny, 61 percent
of all persons charged with auto theft. It is apparent that responsibility for
meeting the problems of crime rests more heavily on no other judicial in-
stitution.
37. Id., at 6.
38. Id., at 23.
39. See e.g., Rendleman supra note 6.
40. Id., at 205-06, making reference to Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
( 1970), in which the Supreme Court found acceptable the "attenuation" of parent-child
relationships resulting from state welfare legislation that indirectly promoted the farming
out of children in large, poor families to relatives.
41. Id., at 252-53. See, Book Review, Katz, When Parents Fail, 4 COLUM. HUMAN
RIGHTS L. REv. 497 (1972).
42. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639, 640, 641 (1967).
43. Id.; see also, Paulsen, The Legal Framework of Child Protection, 66 CoLUM.
~. REV. 679 (1966).
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witnessing a massive shift from private to public efforts to provide child
protective services and an increasing push to make them universally
available.44 Easy analogies of the state to the parent will not and should
not serve to legitimize the state's power over children. If such a rationale
is relied on, it seems reasonable to expect those affected by that power,
frequently the nation's newly militant poor, to confront it in court and
demand that the state's pedormance be as parental as advertised.45 Perhaps
we will see an increase in the number of cases using the writ of habeas
corpus to free juveniles from confinement in institutions demonstrably
not rehabilitative or parental.46
The expressed concern of the Supreme Court for allowing the benevo-
lent experiment of the juvenile justice system to go on without the clamor,
formality and delay of a fully adversary proceeding mayor may not be
warranted. But any impairment of the freedom of defense counsel to wage
a vigorous adversary defense should be firmly opposed. It is a serious
political problem that many in the juvenile justice system and many
lawyers neither accept nor understand that the state and the child are in
fact adversaries in juvenile delinquency cases, and that regardless of the
benevolent intentions of the judge, probation officers and institutional
personnel, involuntary "treatment" of young offenders as a "cure" for
their misbehavior and rebellious tendencies is to those who do not wish
to receive it nothing less than punishment, a coercive exercise of the
police power of the state.
Apparently, despite Gault, the right to counsel is viewed as an un-
necessary safeguard in many juvenile courts. Two post-Gault studies
revealing widespread waiver of the right to counsel found that most of
the waivers by children and parents were uninformed and inadvertent.47
The court involved had simply failed to give proper, adequate and un-
prejudiced notice that the state would provide counsel if the parents could
not afford it.48 One recent study found that attorneys were present in
44. Paulsen, supra note 43, at 710.
45. Id., at 709.
46. This line of attack is suggested in Weiss, Defense of a Juvenile Court Case,
in 2 CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES (R.M. CIPES ed. 1969) 60-15. He cites Fulwood
v. Stone, 394 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See also, reasonable statutory purpose cases,
e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1924);
and Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
47. See, Lefstein, Stapleton & Teitelbaum, In Search of Juvenile Justice: Gault
and Its Implementation, 3 L. & Soc. REv. 491 (1969); Ferster, Courtless & Snethen,
The Juvenile Justice System: In Search of the Role of Counsel, 39 FORD. L. REV. 375,
376-80 (1971).
48. For example, the court's language frequently downplayed the need for counsel,
failed to advise that free counsel was available, or showed the court's impatience with
the idea of counsel. For a holding that a lower court's failure to give proper notice of
right to counsel resulted in an invalid waiver of the right, see In re Ella B., 30 N.Y.2d
352, - N.E.2d - (1972).
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only 24% of the juvenile delinquency cases in a particular jurisdiction.49
Another study of 24 counties, in states where children were allowed jury
trials, found that in 2 of those counties there were lawyers in only 50%
of the cases, in 6 other counties, in less than 25% of the cases, and in
another 3 counties in less than 10%.50
Only in jurisdictions where the public defender or '1aw guardian"
system operates in the juvenile courts are children assisted by counsel as
a matter of course. In such jurisdictions there remain built-in problems
for vigorous adversary defense because the defender is an employee of
the system with a continuing close relationship to the bench and probation
officers.51 It would be preferable for a pool of community based lawyers
to be available for such work, but the practice generally does not pay well,
and the most able members of the Bar usually know nothing about the
procedures in the juvenile court system.52 Even the experienced criminal
lawyer must adapt to the informality, lack of standards, less stringent rules
of evidence, child-saving rhetoric and other imponderables.53
In cases where juvenile counsel is present, lingering and unwarranted
trust by counsel and others in unchallenged benevolence continues to
complicate counsel's performance and effectiveness.54 The hostility of the
courts, legislators and commentators to an adversary approach in juvenile
court is widespread.55 The advocate faces long-held assumptions that the
necessary fact-finding can be done better by trained social workers and
paternalistic judges than by lawyers out to ''beat the rap" for their clients.56
Counsel must not only contend with hostility. He or she shares the
general confusion over the nature of children's rights, which has been
only partly allayed by court decisions. Although the Supreme Court
stated in Gault that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of
Rights is for adults alone," further language in Gault and opinions else-
49. Ferster, Courtless & Snethen, supra note 47, at 386, n.65.
50.Id.
5!. See e.g., A.M. PLAn, supra note 3, at 168-72.
52. Id., 165-67.
53. See Weiss, supra note 46, for an excellent, detailed and practical guide to
effective counselling in the post-Gault juvenile court.
54. See Steinfeldt, Kerper & Friel, The Impact at the Gault Decision in Texas,
20 Juv. CT. JUDGES J. 154 (1969) discussed and cited in Ferster, Courtless & Snethen,
supra note 47, at 388. -
55. A.M. PLAn, supra note 3, at 165.
56. Id. Fact-finding solely by the inquisitorial rather than the adversary method
has a long history of fallibility in juvenile court. See the discussion intra at 397.
However, it is also true that adversary fact-finding breaks down. It breaks down com-
pletely when counsel has information not otherwise available to the court that the
child is guilty but does not offer it. In such a case, the adversary system is justified
primarily as a control on state power and not as a fact-finding method. Our system of
criminal law has traditionally chosen to put the control of state power first, despite the
fact that some of the guilty get away. See ABA Canons of Professional Ethics No.5.
This choice is equally appropriate in the juvenile system.
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where make it clear that children so far are not the constitutional
equivalents of adults.1IT
Effective advocacy is also hindered by the role conflict inevitable in
a system in which individuals may be subjected to involuntary treatment
and the deprivation of liberty for their own good. "The basis of the
adversary system is the separation of roles . . ."58 and yet the structure of
the juvenile court system requires that the judge act as judge, prosecutor
and protector,59 the probation officer as social worker, investigator and
law enforcement officer,60 and the defense attorney as both advocate and
guardian.61
If we are truly concerned about «fundamental fairness" to the child
in juvenile court proceedings, and adequately sensitive to the need for
standards and controls on the state's power to intervene in private lives, it
is difficult to escape the conclusion that the juvenile court must move
away from attitudes and practices which dilute the adversariness of the
proceedings.
Whatever else is needed in the juvenile court system, and reforms of
many kinds are called for, one clear need is for accurate fact-finding.
Neither surmise nor conjecture is an adequate basis for governmental in-
terference with liberty. The question of what facts need to be shown in
juvenile court is unsettled.62 The court's concern for rehabilitation has
focused its attention not only on the commission of specific acts but on facts
of the juvenile's total personality and its interaction with the environment.63
Whatever the focus, fact-finding is the primary task of the adjudicatory
phase of the juvenile court proceedings. One-sided investigations by social
workers and police have led to reports which contain questionable data.
Juveniles' social files, often introduced at the adjudicatory hearing, typically
contain rumor, gossip and prejudicial school and probation reports,64 as
well as psychiatric reports full of professional jargon that impresses judges.65
Psychiatric testing done under court auspices has produced results which
differ significantly and prejudicially from test results obtained by defense
57. 387 U.S. at 13. See e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944);
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (Justice
Stewart concurring).
58. Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function
and Form, 1965 WISC. L. REv. 7, 43.
59. See e.g., Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUM.
L. REV. 281, 297-309 (1967).
60. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 12, at 6.
61. See, e.g., Note, supra note 59, at 327; Dyson & Dyson, 9 J. FAM. L. 1, 58
(1969).
62. For a discussion of the issues, see F.A. ALLEN, supra note 4, at 18-22.
63. A.M. PLATT, supra note 3, at 141-42.
64. See e.g., Note, supra note 59, at 337-38.
65. Lemert, The Juvenile Court-Quest and Realities, TASK FORCE REPORT supra
note 12, at 103.
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experts.66 No judge should be expected to weigh such evidence without
help from adversary challenge and the presentation of a case for the de-
fense.67 If the long history of the common law has illustrated that full
adversary proceedings are necessary for the protection of adults in crim-
inal proceedings, how can we deny that protection to the juvenile facing
delinquency charges and incarceration?68 Indeed, since the broad dis-
cretion of the juvenile court in defining delinquency and in setting sentence
lengths poses special threats, should not the juvenile have greater protec-
tion than adults?69
Full adversary proceedings do not mean that counsel must employ a
rigidly technical approach, bitterly contesting every point and issue. The
adversary system has always had room for compromise according to the
client's best interest. Our adversary system does not ".... excessively seek for
truth, but rather seek[s] to strike a decent balance between the quantum
of proof of guilt and the values of individual freedom."70 The need for
full adversariness probably does mean, however, that there must be clearer
role separation in the juvenile courts, a skeptical approach to benevolent
pretensions, and vigorous and scrupulous deference by counsel to the wishes
of his client, the child.71
Some lawyers believe that it is not possible to counsel, relate to, and
represent a child as one does an adult. There are, of course, situations
involving children of very young age, or limited intelligence, who will not
understand legal proceedings. The lawyer's role in such cases might more
nearly approach that of guardian than advocate, but even in such cases he
should put the state to its proof. The exchange quoted at the outset of
this article took place between the writer and a nine year old child after a
trial in which he was found innocent of burglary. When it was explained
66. Dyson & Dyson, supra note 61, at 59-61.
67. See e.g., Handler, supra note 58, at 49; Note supra note 58, at 336. But see
dicta of Justice White concurring in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. at 550, ex-
pressing remarkable trust in the juvenile court's ability to avoid prejudgment in such
a situation.
68. See e.g., Dissent of Justice Douglas in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
at 559.
69. TASK FORCE REpORT, supra note 12, at 23: Juveniles receive "... not in-
frequ~ntly . ',; sanctions more severe than those an adult would receive for like
behavIOr ....
70. N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, supra note 2, at 161.
71. For reports and discussion on the role of defense counsel in the juvenile
system at or since the time of the Gault decision, see generally, N. LEFSTEIN & V.
STAPLETON, COUNSEL IN JUVENILE COURTS: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY, NATIONAL
COUNCIL OF JUVENILE COURT JUDGES (1967); Stapleton, A Social Scientist's View of
Gault and a Plea for the Experimenting Society, 1 YALE REv. OF L. & SOC. ACTION 72
(1970); Wizner, Juvenile Justice and the Rehabilitative Ideal: A Response to Mr.
Stapleton, 1 YALE REv. OF L. & SOC. ACTION 82 (1970); Teitelbaum, Gault and the
"Experimenting Society": A Response to Mr. Stapleton, 1 YALE REV. OF L. & Soc.
ACTION 86 (1970); Wizner, The Defense Counsel: Neither Father, Judge, Probation
Officer, or Social Worker, 7 TRIAL, September/October 1971, at 30.
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to him what he had «won" was a decision that he "didn't do it" he re-
plied, «but I didn't do it." Obviously, the arresting officer, intake worker
and prosecutor did not believe him, and only by cross examination of the
state's witnesses, and testimony of witnesses in support of the child's story,
did the matter reach a just result. The child clearly did not comprehend
all that was going on in the trial, but he benefited from the result.
Most youngsters, however, do understand what is at stake in juvenile
delinquency proceedings. They understand that they are in trouble, why
they are in trouble, and what can happen to them once they are found to
be juvenile delinquents. They are not too innocent to play the role of
criminal defendant.72 Most children charged with juvenile delinquency
wish to be «acquitted," or to get the lightest "sentence" possible, even if
supervision, counselling treatment or institutionalization promises to benefit
them.73 The lawyer should certainly act as an interpreter of the juvenile
court to the child, trying to make as clear as possible to him the significance,
both good and bad, of what might happen to him there. But it is not
counsel's role, necessarily, to achieve for the child what the counselor
judge or prosecutor thinks is best for him. The lawyer's role is to be the
child's advocate, to give mature, articulate, intelligent and persuasive voice
to the child's expressed wishes with respect to the «best" outcome of the case.
Gault provided the right to counsel as the principal check on the
abuses of parens patriae.74 If counsel limits the defense of the child be-
cause of parens patriae assumptions that the court and the child are not
adversaries, that check is undermined. Counsel indeed becomes part of the
problem instead of part of the solution. If the presence of independent
counsel is «the keystone of the whole structure of guarantees that a mini-
mum system of procedural justice requires,"75 then counsel must vigorously
maintain an independent stance. He or she must speak unequivocally for
the child's legal rights.76 The child's right to be heard requires no less.
72. N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, supra note 2, at 163-64:
"... [S]ome experience with children's courts and juvenile institutions leads
one rapidly to eschew the belief in the innate innocence of children. Indeed,
when one includes the incompetent, the decrepit, and the lost characters that
form so much of the grist of the mill of adult courts, one might suspect that
there is a lesser quantum of responsibility per hundred in adult cases than
in juvenile cases."
73. This conclusion, a fairly obvious one, is based on the writer's own experience
and that of numerous lawyers of his acqaintance who represent children in delinquency
cases.
74. 367 U.S. at 38 & n.65.
75. TASK FORCE REpORT, supra note 12, at 32, quoted in 367 U.S. at n.65.
76. This view has been adopted by juvenile court public defenders in San Leandro,
California, see Note, supra note 59, at 327 & n.246, and by the "Law Guardians" serving
New York juvenile courts. Dyson & Dyson, supra note 60. For a description of the
difficulties of public defenders serving as both social workers and advocates, see Platt,
Schechter & Tiffany, In Defense of Youth: A Case of the Public Defender in Juvenile
Court, 43 IND. L.]. 619 (1968).
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